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Abstract 
A recent debate over the financialisation of commodity markets has stimulated the 
development of approaches to price formation which incorporate index traders as a 
new trader category in commodity futures markets. I survey these new approaches 
by retracing their emergence to traditional price formation models and show that 
these new models arise from a synthesis between commodity arbitrage pricing and 
asset pricing theories in the tradition of Keynesian inspired hedging pressure 
models. Based on these insights, I derive testable hypotheses to provide guidance 
for a growing literature that seeks to empirically evaluate the effects of index traders 
on price discovery and risk management in commodity futures markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, commodity futures markets have attracted a large influx of 
liquidity due to their favourable diversification properties (Erb and Harvey, 2006; 
Gorton and Rouwenhorst, 2006) and their satisfactory performance as an alternative 
asset class in a low interest environment (Mayer, 2012; Basu and Gavin, 2011). 
Investors can achieve exposure through passive instruments such as commodity 
indices, whereby investments are allocated to commodity futures markets in 
accordance with the composition of the index investors seek to replicate. Index 
traders are long-only, do not attempt to arbitrage the market, their trading behaviour 
is largely detached from the respective market’s fundamentals and positions are 
correlated with global liquidity cycles (Nissanke, 2012; Mayer, 2012; Brunetti and 
Reiffen, 2014). Due to their unique investment behaviour, index traders were 
suspected to cause price levels, volatilities and co-movements beyond what could be 
explained by market fundamentals (Masters, 2008). 
This so called ‘financialisation of commodity markets’, e.g. see Irwin and Sanders 
(2012) and Henderson et al. (2015), has stimulated the development of new 
approaches to price formation in commodity futures markets which incorporate the 
presence of index traders. Historically, price formation models for commodity futures 
markets emerged from two interlinked traditions: arbitrage pricing and asset pricing 
models. Arbitrage pricing models derive intertemporal price relations between spot 
and futures markets (or between futures with different maturity dates) under to the 
law of one price. Asset pricing models derive prices from agents’ expectations under 
market clearing conditions. Both traditions consider heterogenous agents by 
distinguishing between hedgers and speculators in the arbitrage pricing literature 
and informed and uninformed speculators in the asset pricing literature. With the 
arrival of index traders, a new generation of price formation models emerged which 
provides crucial insights into the implications of index trading for price discovery and 
risk management.  
The prime objective of this paper is to provide guidance for a growing empirical 
literature that investigates financialisation effects, e.g. see Irwin and Sanders (2011), 
Irwin (2013), Fattouh et al. (2013), Cheng and Xiong (2014) and Boyd et al. (2018), 
by reviewing recently developed models of price formation in financialised 
commodity markets. I focus on storable primary commodities and their futures 
markets.  I hence largely exclude an important set of literature that investigates price 
formation in commodity spot and storage markets – see Gouel (2012) for a 
comprehensive review –, unless this literature makes direct reference to implications 
of speculative trading in futures for spot and storage markets. Specifically, I retrace 
the emergence of new approaches to price formation in financialised commodity 
markets to arbitrage and asset pricing models which are reviewed in sections two 
and three, before reviewing these new approaches to price formation in section four. 
I show that the new approaches emerge from a synthesis between arbitrage and 
asset pricing theories, following closely Keynesian inspired hedging pressure 
theories. In section five, I derive testable hypotheses as guidance for a growing 
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empirical literature on the financialisation of commodity markets. The sixth section 
concludes with suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Arbitrage Pricing Models 
A no-arbitrage condition between commodity futures and their underlying spot prices 
builds the foundation for different theories of price formation in commodity markets. 
Prices are assumed to be driven by supply and demand conditions in the spot 
markets, while the possibility of arbitrage ensures alignment of the futures price to its 
underlying physical market. The no-arbitrage condition can be summarised as in Eq. 
(1). 𝐹𝑡,𝑇 is the futures price at time 𝑡 that matures at time 𝑇, 𝑆𝑡 is the cash price, 𝑟𝑡 
and 𝑤𝑡 are cost of capital and cost of storage and 𝜏 = 𝑇 − 𝑡 is the time to maturity: 
𝐹𝑡,𝑇 = 𝑆𝑡𝑒
(𝑟𝑡+𝑤𝑡)𝜏     (1) 
At maturity 𝜏 → 0 so that 𝐹𝑡,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑡 and the market basis 𝐵𝑡 ≡ 𝑆𝑡 − 𝐹𝑡,𝑡 = 0. However, 
futures and spot prices do not necessarily comply with Eq. (1) empirically. 
Particularly, a situation in which the futures contract trades below the spot price 
(backwardation) has received attention since futures contracts are bound to trade 
above the spot price (contango), as rt, wt ≥ 0 in Eq. (1). The theory of storage, 
ascribed to Kaldor (1939), Working (1949) and Brennan (1958), and the theory of 
risk premium, advanced by Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939), offer two distinct, 
although complementary, explanations for backwardation.  
2.1 Theory of Storage 
The theory of storage explains backwardation with the distinct economic properties 
of the physical good compared to its derivative. Kaldor (1939) introduced a 
convenience yield, φt, which is acquired from owning a commodity and is inversely 
related to speculative stocks, that is, stocks beyond what is required for normal 
business, 𝐼𝑡.  
𝐹𝑡,𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑡𝑒
(𝑟𝑡+𝑤𝑡−𝜑𝑡(𝐼𝑡))𝜏     (2) 
As evident from Eq. (2), the extent of backwardation does not have a limit, but a 
contango has its maximum in the carry cost. A negative basis, in theory, cannot 
exceed 𝑟𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡 (with 𝜑𝑡 = 0), while a positive basis depends on the ‘size’ of the 
convenience yield (Lautier, 2005).  
The convenience yield found multiple interpretations in the literature. Kaldor (1939) 
originally introduced the yield as the inverse of Keynes’s own rate of interest. Later 
authors, such as Brennan (1958), Pindyck (2001), Bozic and Fortenbery (2011) and 
Pirrong (2011) proposed a utility-based explanation of the convenience yield. The 
convenience yield accrues to the owner of inventory due to the opportunity gained 
from taking advantage of an unexpected increase in demand. Despite the different 
opinions on what constitutes the convenience yield, authors agree on an inverse 
relationship between the yield and storage. Pindyck (2001) formalises this 
relationship and shows that if a commodity is storable, the equilibrium in the physical 
  
 
4 
market is not only governed by production and consumption, but also by changes in 
inventories, which in turn enters the futures price through the convenience yield. 
The triangular relationship between spot, inventory and futures markets unfolds 
complex feedback mechanisms. Positive price trends in volatile markets can be 
intensified through inventory hoarding, either because inventories serve as physical 
options (Deaton and Laroque 1992; Singleton 2014), or because they are 
accumulated for precautionary reasons (Pindyck 2001; Bozic and Fortenbery 2011). 
While various models take these complex feedback mechanisms into consideration – 
see Gouel (2012) for a comprehensive overview – many of these models remain 
incomplete because futures markets are modelled as a reflection of dynamics in spot 
and inventory markets; e.g. Pindyck (2001). Conceptualised this way, futures 
markets serve an information function by revealing storage availability and agents’ 
preferences through the convenience yield, but do not serve a price discovery 
function.  
2.2 Theory of risk premium 
A second, arbitrage-based approach, assumes that prices should be subject to a risk 
premium since non-commercial speculators demand a premium for taking on 
hedgers’ risk (Keynes, 1930; Hicks, 1939, p. 147-8). As the number of short hedgers 
does not match the number of long hedgers at any point in time, speculators1 are 
invaluable in providing liquidity  (Working, 1960). Hedgers are not exposed to any 
price risk after entering the hedging position, while speculators take on risk exposure 
and therefore provide an insurance service to hedgers. Depending on the relative 
weight of short and long hedgers in the market, futures markets are in contango or in 
backwardation.  
The original risk premium theory is based on an excess demand framework and was 
critiqued by Fama and French (1987) and others for being incompatible with general 
equilibrium theory (Cootner, 1960). Two strands of theories, which seek to make 
Keynes’s risk premium approach coherent within a neoclassical framework, have 
evolved: (1) theories of asset-pricing, which assign a risk premium to (systematic) 
risk; and (2) theories of hedging pressure, which incorporate market imperfections, 
like transaction costs, into multiple-period pricing models.  
Kaldor (1939) links the risk premium to the uncertain expectations of future prices 
and lays the foundation for an asset-pricing interpretation of the premium. The 
degree of uncertainty is proportional to the own price variance, 𝜎𝑓
2 and the difference 
between the expected spot price and current spot price is determined by net-carry 
cost and a risk premium, 𝜋𝑡, times the original cash outlay. With small letters for the 
natural logarithm:  
𝐸𝑡[𝑠𝑇] − 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 + 𝑤𝑡 − 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜋𝑡(𝜎𝑓
2)𝑠𝑡    (3) 
                                            
1 Following Working (1960), the term speculator is here used for any trader whose primary business 
does not involve trading the physical commodity. 
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By taking logs and substituting Eq. (2) into Eq. (3), it is shown that the forward price, 
𝑓𝑡,𝑇, falls short of the expected spot price by the risk premium and the forward price 
becomes a biased estimator of the expected future spot price.  
𝑓𝑡,𝑇 = 𝐸𝑡[𝑠𝑇] − 𝑠𝑡𝜋𝑡(𝜎𝑓
2)     (4) 
Departing from Kaldor (1939), Dusak (1973) links the risk premium to systematic risk 
instead of idiosyncratic risk. She is the first to apply a capital asset-pricing model 
(CAPM) to the commodity futures market and to show that the expected excess 
return, 𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑐,𝑇] − 𝑟𝑡, which accrues to the holder of a commodity futures contract is 
equal to the excess market return, 𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑚,𝑇] − 𝑟𝑡,, multiplied by the market beta 
defined as 𝛽𝑐 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑚, 𝑅𝑐) 𝜎
2(𝑅𝑚)⁄ .  
𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑐,𝑇] − 𝑟𝑡 = (𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑚,𝑇] − 𝑟𝑡)𝛽𝑐    (5) 
After substituting for 𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑐,𝑇] − 𝑟𝑡 = {𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇] − 𝑃𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡)} 𝑃𝑡⁄  and rearranging, Eq. (5) 
yields 𝑃𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑓𝑡) = 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇] − 𝑃𝑡𝛽𝑐(𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑚,𝑇] − 𝑟𝑡), with 𝑃𝑡 being the current commodity 
price. Following Dusak (1973), one can interpret 𝑃𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡) as the current futures 
price for delivery and payment in period T and 𝐸𝑡[𝑃𝑇] as the spot price expected at T, 
which leads to Eq. (4), with 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽𝑐(𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑚,𝑇] − 𝑟𝑡).  
Alongside theories which link the risk premium to own and cross-price variation, 
hedging pressure theories developed, which are, arguably, closer to Keynes’s 
original idea. Hedging pressure models derive the premium as a function of demand 
for hedging positions under the assumption that the supply of contrarians to hedging 
positions is not perfectly elastic due to market frictions (Hirshleifer, 1988; 1990; 
Chang, 1985; Bessembinder, 1992).  
Hirshleifer (1988) distinguishes between two trader types – producers (hedgers) and 
outside investors (speculators) – and assumes that the latter trader type incurs 
transaction costs, due to fixed set-up costs or effective informational barriers. In a 
later model, he adds fixed set-up costs for long hedgers and assumes risk-averse 
speculators instead (Hirshleifer, 1990). Under these assumptions, a trader’s optimal 
choice of positions depends on the size of the transaction cost and the trader’s risk 
perception. Hirshleifer (1988; 1990) shows that under these assumptions, the risk 
premium entails a systematic risk component as in Dusak (1973), which depends on 
the market beta – the first component of Eq. (6) – and a residual risk component, 
which rises with transaction costs 𝑘 and hence, the number hedgers relative to the 
number of speculators – the second component of Eq. (6).   
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽𝑐(𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑚,𝑇] − 𝑟𝑡) ± 𝜎𝑐√2𝛼𝑘(1 − 𝜌2)   (6) 
The second component can be positive and negative, depending on whether there 
are more short or long hedgers in the market. 𝜎𝑐 is the standard deviation of 𝑅𝑐, 𝛼 is 
the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and 𝜌 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑚, 𝑅𝑐) 𝜎(𝑅𝑚)𝜎(𝑅𝑐)⁄ . Hedging 
pressure theories are related to more general price pressure theories which are 
based on the assumptions of risk aversion and transaction costs; e.g. see Harris and 
Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986). Since these models combine arbitrage pricing with 
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a microstructure for trader behaviour, they are a synthesis of arbitrage and asset 
pricing models. Table 1 summarises the different theories derived from the simple 
no-arbitrage condition in their final forms of which the latest form combines storage 
costs, convenience yield, systematic risk and hedging pressure in a single model.  
 
Table 1. Summary Table arbitrage Pricing Models 
No-arbitrage Convenience yield Risk premium 
 
𝑓𝑡,𝑇
= 𝑠𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡) + 𝑤𝑡 
→ 
 
𝑓𝑡,𝑇  
= 𝑠𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑡) + 𝑤𝑡 − 𝜑𝑡 
→ 
 
𝑓𝑡,𝑇 
= 𝐸𝑡[𝑠𝑇] − 𝑠𝑡𝜋𝑡 
→ 
Idiosyncratic 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡(𝜎
2) 
Systematic 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽𝐶(𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑚,𝑇] − 𝑟𝑡) 
Hedging pressure 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡,𝑚 ± 𝜋𝑡,𝑘 
𝜋𝑡,𝑚 = 𝛽𝐶(𝐸𝑡[𝑅𝑚,𝑇] − 𝑟𝑡) 
𝜋𝑡,𝑘 = ±𝜎𝑐√2𝛼𝑘(1 − 𝜌2) 
Notes: Summary based on Eq. (1) – (6). Futures and spot prices are in logarithms and for ease of presentation 
𝜏 = 1.  
 
3. Asset Pricing Models 
Asset pricing models are based on a different kind of arbitrage relation than the 
previously reviewed storage models and are more general in that they apply to all 
asset classes and not only commodities.2 The asset pricing literature relies on 
fundamental arbitrage where arbitrage opportunities arise if prices deviate from their 
fundamental value, while previously reviewed models rely on spatial arbitrage where 
arbitrage opportunities arise if spot3 and futures prices deviate. By implication, 
spatial arbitrage enforces a close relationship between two related markets but does 
not necessarily link an asset to its fundamental value. Fundamental arbitrage 
corrects for an over- or under-valuation of an asset, but not for a misspecification in 
relative prices.   
The concept of fundamental arbitrage is related to the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH), first formulated by Fama (1965) in its weak form. In accordance with the 
hypothesis, commodity futures prices are determined by trader’ consensus 
expectations regarding the market’s future fundamental value. Each trader is 
assumed to base her trading decision on a subset [𝛺𝑖,𝑡] of the total information set of 
market fundamentals [?̅?]. Consequently, each position taken by a trader will add to 
the market information density. With perfect foresight, the probability of the future 
price of the commodity would be certain, so that: 𝑃(𝑆𝑡+1|?̅?) = 1, and hence: 𝐹𝑡,𝑇 =
𝐸𝑡[𝑆𝑇|?̅?] = 𝑆𝑇.  
The proposed alignment of a market with its fundamentals relies on a row of 
conditions. Key market participants must evaluate assets regarding fundamentals 
only, base their actions on publicly available information or their own private sources 
                                            
2 As discussed previously, arbitrage pricing or storage models intersect with the asset pricing 
literature in the risk premium approaches.  
3 Or any other close substitute to futures. 
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and do so independently of each other. If these conditions are met, traders’ price 
expectations are identically and independently distributed around the fundamental 
value of the commodity and the more traders enter the market, the closer the futures 
price approaches its fundamental value (Carter, 1991). Further, sophisticated 
arbitrageurs immediately identify and take advantage of any price deviation induced 
by misguided ‘noise’ traders if unconstrained in their resources. These assumptions 
have been challenged on epistemological grounds by the behavioural finance and 
market microstructure literature and on ontological grounds by the Post-Keynesian 
literature. 
3.1 Bounded Rationality and Rational Herding 
Bounded rationality theories question the capabilities of individuals to act fully 
rational, while rational herding theories acknowledge that if the degree of uncertainty 
is measurable but information gathering is costly, traders are incentivised to follow 
other traders instead of their own information; see Shleifer (2000) for an overview. 
Both theories comprehend a row of different trader behaviours, including arbitrage as 
well as trend following, chartism and other technical trading strategies. Under the 
assumption of heterogeneity in trading motives and strategies, not every investor’s 
position necessarily adds to the overall information set regarding market 
fundamentals (Hayes, 2006; Adam and Marcet, 2010a, 2010b).  
The bounded rationality perspective is closely linked to behavioural finance, which 
moves away from the assumption of fully rational agents and takes a more eclectic 
approach to understanding agents’ behaviour. Theories are informed by cognitive 
science, human psychology, evolutionary biology and sociology (Baddeley, 2010). 
The term bounded rationality was originally coined by Simon (1955), who argues that 
individuals are unable to act as assumed in the neoclassical optimisation process. 
Earlier studies in the field understand noise traders as non-rational insofar as their 
demand for risky assets is affected by beliefs and sentiments. Traders tend to 
become overly optimistic or pessimistic (Shleifer and Summers, 1990) and tend to 
employ common heuristics to assess complex probabilities (De Long et al., 1990; 
Hirschleifer, 2001). Consequently, markets frequently overreact or underreact to 
information as optimising agents employ trial-and-error strategies in an evolutionary 
manner (De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006; Adam and Marcet, 2010a, 2010b; Lo, 
2012). With increasing uncertainty, even rational traders switch to trial-and-error 
strategies. Such behaviour of market participants results in multiple equilibria and 
low-frequency boom and bust cycles as investment strategies undergo cycles of 
profit and loss. 
The rational herding perspective introduces market frictions and is closely associated 
with market microstructure theories, which take the institutional environment and its 
links to the price formation process into consideration (O’Hara, 1997). Rational 
herding can occur in the presence of market friction such as payoff externalities, 
principal-agent problems, and informational learning (Devenow and Welch, 1996). 
The literature around payoff externalities focuses on second- and third-generation 
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currency crisis models and the occurrence of bank runs (Krugman, 1979; Obstfeld, 
1986; Jeanne, 2000). Principal-agent problems arise over perverse incentives so 
that, for instance, asset managers prefer to ‘hide in the herd’ (Devenow and Welch, 
1996; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). The third friction arises when partially informed 
agents discard their own information in the light of information inferred from the 
observed actions of other agents due to known information asymmetries and costs to 
information gathering (Welch, 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; 
McAleer and Radalj, 2013).  
Both strands of literature, bounded rationality and rational herding theories, divide 
financial market participants into two categories: informed fundamental arbitrage 
traders and uninformed systematic noise traders. Both theories conclude that noise 
trader positions can be strongly correlated and lead to aggregate demand shifts, 
which impact prices if the noise traders’ momentum in the market is large enough. 
Combining these insights with the arbitrage pricing theories, the alignment of 
consensus expectation across spot and futures markets, then depends on the 
efficiency of fundamental arbitrage. If limits to fundamental arbitrage exists due to 
the presence of ‘noise trader risk’ (De Long et al., 1990), transaction costs such as 
margin calls (Shleifer and Summers, 1990) or agency problems if arbitrage traders 
trade on behalf of clients (Shleifer und Vishny, 1997), fundamental arbitrage might 
fail to align spot and futures prices.  
3.2 Post-Keynesian Fundamental Uncertainty 
Post-Keynesian authors reject the assumption of ergodicity, so that ‘true’ uncertainty 
arises. An uncertain future is unknowable and cannot be predicted based on past 
and present observations (Lawson, 1985). Ergodicity is rejected because of the 
transmutable nature of the future resulting in fundamental uncertainty (Dunn, 2001). 
If the system is permanently changed, the past is not representative of the future 
(Davidson, 2002, p. 47). Therefore, a commodity’s expected fundamental value 
cannot be quantified by market practitioners (Bernstein, 1999). If market practitioners 
are aware of the unknowability of the future, portfolio protection through 
diversification against changes in financial markets is an important activity 
(Davidson, 2002, p. 188). So, too, is speculation over the psychological state of other 
market practitioners (Carabelli, 2002).  
Keynes’s own writing about uncertainty has found slightly different interpretations 
mong Post-Keynesian scholars (Rosser Jr., 2001). For instance, Lawson (1985) 
stresses that Keynes does not reject the existence of knowledge per se. He 
distinguishes between three cases, which are knowledge of, knowledge about, and 
the unknowable. ‘Knowledge about’ is knowledge about the probability proposition of 
something (secondary proposition), but not the ‘knowledge of’ something (primary 
proposition). Knowledge of a secondary proposition then leads to a ‘rational belief of 
the appropriate degree’ in the primary proposition. He distinguishes between cases 
where the probability is unknown due to lack of skills — close to the bounded 
rationality literature — and cases where the probability is immeasurable or 
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indeterminate. Only in the latter case does true uncertainty exist, under which people 
fall back on conventions.  
For Lawson (1985), traders are heterogeneous in their trading strategies, since 
trading motives are conditioned on knowledge and the interpretation of knowledge 
that is obtained by each individual trader through practice. Different societies will 
bring about different trading motives, and hence, behaviour. Similarly, Bibow et al. 
(2005) refer to Beckert (1996) and argue that reliance on peoples’ ‘social devices’ 
makes action more predictable. Mimicking then arises from the attempt to conform to 
the majority.  
For bounded rationality, rational herding and fundamental uncertainty, the past only 
offers limited guidance for predicting future events, because the past cannot be fully 
comprehended, the comprehension of the past is costly, or the past is substantially 
different from the future. In all three settings, optimisation is impossible or greatly 
limited so that agents return to conventions violating rationality assumptions of the 
EMH.  
 
4. Price Formation in Financialised Commodity Markets 
With the arrival of index traders in commodity futures markets the traditional binary 
divisions between hedgers and liquidity providing speculators or informed and 
uninformed speculators become insufficient as index traders appear to be of an 
altogether different kind. With reference to the previously reviewed literature, studies 
discussing potential implications of index traders for price discovery and hedging 
effectiveness in commodity futures markets suggest a fourfold division of trader 
types: hedgers, informed speculators, uninformed speculators and index traders; e.g. 
see Nissanke (2012) and Mayer (2012). 
The four trader types arise from different combinations of the contrasting categories 
informed and uninformed traders and active and passive traders as summarised in 
Table 2. Active traders are those who trade based on commodity specific information 
signals, either information signals about market fundamentals or information 
extracted from price signals by use of statistical patterns. The latter being referred to 
as uninformed traders as they attempt to infer information from price signals and do 
not bring new information into the price discovery process. Passive traders are those 
who do not take commodity specific information into consideration when making 
trading decisions but rather base their trading strategies on global liquidity cycles.  
 
Table 2. Trader Categories under Different Theories 
   Arbitrage Pricing 
Theories 
Asset  
Pricing Theories 
Financialisation 
Theories 
Active Informed Hedgers/Arbitrage X (X) X 
  Speculators/Arbitrage X X X 
 Uninformed Speculators/Chartists  X (X) 
Passive Uninformed Index investors   X 
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Indices are relatively novel investment instruments for commodities but have a long 
history in stock markets where index investments were empirically linked to 
substantial and relatively permanent increases on stock returns (Harris and Gurel, 
1986; Shleifer, 1986), a reduction in the information content of stock markets 
resulting in an increase in price volatility (Grossman, 1988; Brennan and Schwartz, 
1989), and an increase in co-movement across indexed stocks (Greenwood, 2005; 
Barberis et al., 2005; Basak and Pavlova, 2013).  
In the following, I will focus on approaches to price formation that explicitly account 
for the presence of index traders as passive investors in commodity futures markets. 
To the best of my knowledge, only three pricing models, compared in Table 3, fall 
into this category: Basak and Pavlova (2016), Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) and 
Hamilton and Wu (2014; 2015). All three models build on a synthesis of arbitrage 
pricing and asset pricing models, with reference to hedging and price pressure 
theories; although the synthesis remains incomplete in some important ways as I will 
discuss in the following.  
 
Table 3. Summary of Price Formation Models that Account for Index Investment 
 Basak and Pavlova (2016) Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) Hamilton and Wu (2014) 
Hedgers NA Utility function: 
𝑢𝐻(𝑊𝐻𝑇) = 𝐴 − exp(−𝛼𝑊𝑇). 
Exogenous: NA 
Informed 
speculators 
Utility function: 
𝑢𝑆(𝑊𝑆𝑇) = log(𝑊𝑆𝑇).  
Utility function: 
𝑢𝑆(𝑊𝑆𝑇) =  𝐴 − exp(−𝛼𝑊𝑇). 
Utility function: 
𝑢𝑆(𝑊𝑆𝑇) = 𝐸𝑡[𝑊𝑇] −
𝛼𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑡(𝑊𝑇). 
Index 
investors 
Utility function: 
𝑢𝐼(𝑊𝐼𝑇) = (𝑎 + 𝑏𝜓𝑇)log (𝑊𝐼𝑇), 
𝑎, 𝑏 > 0  
𝜓𝑇 = ∏ 𝐹𝑖𝑇
1/𝐿𝐿
𝑖=1 , 𝐿 ≤ 𝐾. 
Exogenous: 
𝐼𝑖. (positions in contract i) 
𝑁𝐻𝑋𝐻
𝑖 + 𝑁𝑆𝑋𝑠
𝑖 = −𝐼𝑖 .  
Exogenous: 
𝐼𝑖. (positions in contract i) 
Investment 
choices 
Stock market, bond market, 
commodity market. 
𝑊𝑛𝑇 = ∑ 𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑛 + ∑ 𝑓𝑡𝑋𝑛,  
𝑛 ∈ {𝑆, 𝐼}. 
Two consecutive futures 
contracts traded at the same 
market.  
𝑊𝑛𝑇 = 𝑊0 + ∑ 𝑓𝑡𝑋𝑛 + 𝑓𝑇𝐶𝑛, 
𝑛 ∈ {𝑆, 𝐻}, 𝐶𝑆 = 0, 𝐶𝐻 = 𝐶 
Stock market, bond market, 
commodity market. 
𝑊𝑆𝑇 = ∑ 𝑟𝑡𝑄𝑆 + ∑ 𝑓𝑡𝑋𝑆. 
Implications Excess co-movement, 
volatility, price level. 
Excess spread, co-
movement, price level.  
Excess spread, price level. 
Extension 
spot prices 
Extension of Deaton and 
Laroque (1992). Inventory 
hoarding resulting in higher 
spot prices.  
NA NA 
Notes: 𝑇 is the date of consumption, 𝑡 is the current date, 𝑢 is utility, 𝑊𝑛 is the n
th investors wealth, 𝑁 is the total 
number of investors in the market, 𝑋𝑛 is the total number of futures positions held by the n
th investor, 𝐶𝑛 the 
total number of physical positions held by the nth investor, 𝑄𝑛 is the total number of other asset positions 
(stocks) held by the nth investor, 𝐹𝑖 is the futures price of the i
th contract, 𝑓𝑖 is the return on the i
th futures 
contract, 𝑟 is the return on other assets (stocks), 𝐾 is the total number of commodities available, 𝜓 is he value 
of a commodity index, and 𝛼 is a measure of risk aversion.  
 
Basak and Pavlova (2016) suggest a dual trader division in which they contrast 
informed speculators and institutional investors that hold commodity indices as part 
of their portfolio. They do not make explicit reference to the hedging pressure 
literature, but to price pressure models in general and the literature on index trading 
in stock markets (Basak and Pavlova 2013). They show that index investment leads 
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to co-movement between commodities included in the same index, increased price 
volatilities and increased price levels. Based on the competitive storage model by 
Deaton and Laroque (1992), Basak and Pavlova (2016) show that if institutional 
investors are also shareholders of storage firms, inventories are withheld, which, in 
turn, leads to higher spot prices.  
Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) consider index traders, informed speculators and short 
hedgers, with index positions being modelled as exogenous. Traders diversify into 
different futures contracts of the same commodity. They show that the calendar 
spread is enlarged and thereby costs for short hedgers diminished by index traders 
rolling over their positions. Hamilton and Wu (2014; 2015) also consider index 
traders, informed speculators and short hedgers and show that index investment has 
the inverse effect of hedging pressure. Reminiscent of the argument made by Kaldor 
(1939) and Hicks (1939, pp. 146), long index traders ease hedging pressure by short 
hedgers as long as short hedging positions exceed long index positions. However, 
index traders have to pay the premium, if their long positions exceed short hedging 
needs. Hence, index pressure and hedging pressure alternate with the composition 
of traders in the market.        
Akin to the hedging pressure literature, the three models assume either credit 
constrained or risk averse speculators so that both hedgers and index traders must 
pay a premium to liquidity providing speculators. While these models successfully 
incorporate index traders, only Basak and Pavlova (2016) endogenously model 
index traders’ behaviour. They draw from a market microstructure model they 
develop in an earlier paper for stock markets (Basak and Pavlova 2013). Their model 
is hence a synthesis of heding pressure and market microstructure models, while 
Brunetti and Reiffen (2014) and Hamilton and Wu (2014) draw on the hedging 
pressure literature alone.   
However, the synthesis remains incomplete as one trader category referenced by 
the financialisation and asset pricing literature is omitted from all three models, 
uninformed and potentially trend following speculators; see Table 2. Trend following 
behaviour is likely in commodity markets, where information asymmetry is an 
inherent feature; see Cheng and Xiong (2014), Sockin and Xiong (2015), Goldstein 
and Yang (2016). Hedgers have a known information advantage on inventory levels, 
as well as future production and consumption. Since the identity of a trader is not 
disclosed, a large inflow of index traders could be confused with a trade placed by an 
informed hedger. The prevalence of extrapolative traders may prompt arbitrageurs to 
close their short positions by going long, as margin calls pose increasing costs and 
trend-following behaviour becomes profitable.  
Another limitation of the pricing models summarised in Table 3, except for Basak and 
Pavlova (2016), is the neglect of the linkages between futures, spot and inventory 
markets. Several recent contributions by Knittel and Pindyck (2016), Kilian and 
Murphy (2014), Acharya et al. (2013), Ekeland et al. (2015), Sockin and Xiong 
(2015) and Goldstein and Yang (2016) could potential complement the reviewed 
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models in Table 3. These contributions, summarised in Table 4, incorporate 
speculative effects in commodity futures (and spot) markets and derive implications 
for spot and storage markets. Although none of these studies consider index traders 
as a separate trader category but only uninformed or partially informed speculators, 
they provide important insights into the interplay between futures, spot and inventory 
markets. 
 
Table 4. Summary of Storage Models that Account for Speculation 
 
Knittel and Pindyck (2016) & 
Kilian and Murphy (2014) 
Acharya et al. (2013) & 
Ekeland et al. (2015) 
Sockin and Xiong (2015) & 
Goldstein and Yang (2016) 
Assumptions Traders in spot and inventory 
markets are rational and 
have perfect foresight 
(~EMH). 
Risk averse producers and 
capital constraint speculators 
(~Hedging pressure models) 
Information friction, 
asymmetric information. Risk 
averse producer (~Rational 
herding models; {Hedging 
pressure models})  
Trader types NA, no microstructure 
provided. 
Consumer, Producer {Storer, 
Processor}, Speculator 
Consumer, Storer, 
Processor, {Speculator}. 
Implications Speculative effects through 
storage hoarding, otherwise 
short lived. 
Costs of hedging affects cost 
of storage through market 
basis, affects storage 
decisions.  
Futures markets provide an 
information signal resulting in 
feedback effects from futures 
to spot markets.    
Notes: Curly brackets indicate presence in the second but not the first paper listed in the first row.  
 
Knittel and Pindyck (2016) and Kilian and Murphy (2014) derive a structural model in 
which speculative influences enter in form of a premium to the futures price without 
further elaboration of the origin of the premium. They argue that the premium could 
result in an increase in spot prices via spatial arbitrage, but the increase would be 
short-lived unless speculative hoarding in the inventory market occurs and the price 
elasticity of physical demand and supply is low; the latter being a realistic 
assumption in the short-run due to the financial planning timeframe of corporations 
which might be up to 12 months (Lagi et al. 2011). While insightful, the models by 
Knittel and Pindyck (2016) and Kilian and Murphy (2014) are limited in that they do 
not account for limits to arbitrage, information friction or different trading motives of 
heterogenous agents. They do not provide a microstructure for trader behaviour and 
appear to follow the EMH assumption of rationality and perfect foresight. 
Acharya et al. (2013) synthesise Hirshleifer’s (1988; 1990) hedging pressure model 
with Deaton and Laroque’s (1992) optimal inventory management model. They 
distinguish between three different trader types in their two-period model: consumers 
who are only active in the spot market, risk averse producers who are active in the 
spot, storage and futures market and who use the futures market for hedging and 
speculation and capital constraint speculators who are active in the futures market. 
Ekeland et al. (2015) suggest a similar model but with a four-fold trader division, 
further distinguishing between storers and processors in the producer category to 
distinguish between short and long hedging demand. Both Acharya et al. (2013) and 
Ekeland et al. (2015) show that with increasing (short) hedging pressure, storage 
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becomes costlier due to a stronger risk premium, resulting in a reduction of inventory 
holdings and therefore a lower demand in the spot market.  
The two models by Acharya et al. (2013) and Ekeland et al. (2015) assume 
speculators to act as liquidity providers and hence price pressure originates solely 
from hedging demand. However, implications can be adapted for the index pressure 
models summarised in Table 3.  As index pressure, according to Hamilton and Wu 
(2014; 2015) and Brunetti and Reiffen (2014), contributes to a normal market, 
physical traders are incentivised to store inventories as storage becomes cheaper, 
resulting in a higher demand at the spot market and hence a higher spot price. 
These considerations do not require the assumption of institutional investors buying 
shares of inventory firms as in Basak and Pavlova (2016) or speculative inventory 
hoarding as in Knittel and Pindyck (2016) and Kilian and Murphy (2014).  
Sockin and Xiong (2015) and Goldstein and Yang (2016) show, in contrast to 
previous models, that under information frictions, speculators’ influence on futures 
prices and spot prices is not necessary reflected in changes in inventory. Sockin and 
Xiong (2015) distinguish between consumers, producers and processors in their two-
period model where processors hold private information about global demand and 
producers hold private information about supply shocks. Under these assumptions, 
higher prices can result in higher demand for the commodity as the information effect 
signalling increasing global demand outweighs the cost effect. Goldstein and Yang 
(2016) combine insights from Sockin and Xiong (2015) with hedging pressure 
models by adding fiancial speculators at futures markets and assuming risk averse 
producers and speculators. In their model, financial speculators and hedgers hold 
private information which enter as information signal into prices. Similar to Sockin 
and Xiong (2015), feedback effects between futures and spot markets can lead to 
pro-cyclical trading behaviour without implications for inventory holdings.   
Sockin and Xiong (2015) conclude that the assumption that the ‘futures price of the 
commodity simply tracks the spot price’ must be abandoned (pp.2064). Since the 
two markets host different groups of market participants, the futures price is not 
simply a shadow of the spot price or vice versa, but dynamics in both markets and 
their feedback effects must be considered. Similarly, Goldstein and Yang (2016) 
insist that ‘the futures market is not just a side show, and it has consequences for the 
real side’ (p.11). These insights clearly distinguish these two models from the other 
four in Table 4.  
Commodity pricing models which explicitly account for index traders as a separate 
trader category borrow heavily from Keynesian inspired hedging pressure models. 
Hedging pressure models are built on the assumptions of risk averse producers and 
consumers and capital constraint speculators. These assumptions are carried over 
into the new generation of models which incorporate index pressure alongside 
hedging pressure. A common shortcoming of these new models is the lack of 
consideration of spot and storage markets; a shortcoming which has been 
addressed by a separate set of storage models which account for the presence of 
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speculators but not index traders as a separate trader category. These models draw 
from both the hedging pressure literature and market microstructure models with the 
additional assumption of information friction. A combination of both model types is 
promising. Interestingly, despite their Keynesian roots, none of the models considers 
fundamental uncertainty, which could potentially be an interesting addition. 
 
5. Implications for Empirical Testing 
Drawing on the price formation models in Table 3 and the storage models in Table 4, 
implications for empirical studies that seek to explore implications of the 
financialisation of commodity markets for price formation and risk management can 
be derived. Price formation models which explicitly account for the passive 
investment behaviour of index traders predict excess in price levels, price volatilities, 
and calendar spreads and an increase in co-movement of commodities that are 
listed in the same index. If extending these predictions by insights from storage 
models, one can add an excess in market basis and a reduction in the costs for short 
hedgers to the list of testable predictions.   
Further, a careful distinction between trading strategies is pivotal. This implies that 
Working’s T index in its original form, used by some empirical studies, is not helpful 
in the current debate since it aggregates over passive investors, informed 
speculators and uninformed speculators; see Working (1960). As clearly 
demonstrated by the models reviewed, these trading strategies (or trader types) 
have profoundly different effects on price formation and risk management and hence 
must be clearly distinguished when modelling or testing their effect. In addition, the 
precise effect of index-based investments on price dynamics are based on 
assumptions of risk aversion, capital constraints and/or information asymmetry which 
needs careful investigation.  
The claim of excessive price dynamics is made in relation to what can be justified by 
market fundamentals. Testing these hypotheses empirically is challenging since 
fundamental factors are partly latent or data is difficult to obtain. From an empirical 
point of view, index pressure effects on the calendar spread and market basis are 
potentially better suited to testing the financialisation hypothesis than effects on price 
levels and volatilities. This is because in the calendar spread and market basis, 
fundamental factors cancel out, which alleviates some of the data problems. Table 5 
compares the empirical evidence gathered by four recent literature reviews by Irwin 
and Sanders (2011), Irwin (2013), Fattouh et al. (2013), Cheng and Xiong (2014) 
and Boyd et al. (2018). The studies summarised within each review are differentiated 
by their focus on testable hypothesis and evidence for or against the financialisation 
hypothesis. 
Table 5 suggests an under-representation of studies that focus on calendar spread 
and market basis, while studies that focus on these areas tend to find evidence for a 
financialisation effect more often than studies that focuses on price levels and 
volatilities. Further, more recent studies appear to find evidence for the 
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financialisation hypothesis more often than earlier studies which is evident from the 
larger relative count of studies that find evidence in the two most recent literature 
reviews. The reasons behind these observations could be multiple. For instance, the 
development of index pressure models in recent years might have contributed to a 
better understanding of the implications of financialisation for price dynamics and 
thereby facilitated more apt empirical strategies. Alternatively, the fact that early 
empirical studies have predominantly reported no evidence of a financialisation 
effect, a publication bias against studies that report such evidence might have 
developed. Or different selection criteria for studies included in the review might 
have been chosen by different authors, with the last two literature reviews using 
similar criteria. It is impossible to draw any conclusions from Table 5 regarding the 
reasons for the patterns emerging and the table can be indicative of recent 
developments in the empirical literature at best. 
 
Table 5. Summary of Empirical Evidence  
 Irwin and 
Sanders 
(2011) 
Irwin (2013) Fattouh et al. 
(2013) 
Cheng and 
Xiong (2014) 
Boyd et al. 
(2018) 
Ʃ 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No  
Direct: price level 
& volatility 
3 7 3 10 1 7 5 9 8 13 66 
Indirect: prices 
level & volatility 
2 1 0 0 3 4 9 2 5 2 28 
Direct: basis & 
term structure  
0 1 4 4 1 0 1 1 4 0 16 
Ʃ 5 9 7 14 5 11 15 12 17 15  
Notes: Yes/No studies are those with some/without evidence for an effect of non-commercial traders on price 
dynamics; direct/indirect studies explicitly control/do not explicitly control for trader positions by use of CFTC 
position data; price level & volatility studies are concerned with price levels, returns, price volatilities and co-
movements; basis & term structure studies are concerned with market basis and term structure effects of 
speculation. Where multiple testing methods and conflicting evidence are presented in one study, the study is 
double counted. Empirical studies summarised in the four papers overlap and hence should not be counted as 
separate evidence. Grey literature is excluded from the count. Literature considered here might include 
evidence from precious metal markets which are not the focus of this review.   
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides a review of recent approaches to price formation in financialised 
commodity markets. I show that these recent approaches draw heavily on the 
Keynesian inspired hedging pressure literature while also borrowing from market 
microstructure and rational herding models. Surprisingly, despite their Keynesian 
tradition, asset pricing models that incorporate true uncertainty in the Post-
Keynesian sense are not considered. I further identify some shortcomings when 
extending these index pressure models to spot and storage markets. Three types of 
storage models which incorporate speculative effects by drawing from the EMH, 
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hedging pressure models and market microstructure models are reviewed as 
potential extension.  
In a second step, I derive testable hypotheses from the reviewed models. Predictions 
by recently emerged index pressure models largely support the claims made early in 
the financialisation debate, e.g. Masters (2008), such as excessive price levels and 
volatilities, an increase in co-movement of commodities of the same index, and 
excessive calendar spreads and market basis. However, the derived hypotheses are 
formulated as excess price dynamics relative to what would could be explained by 
market fundamentals. Data constraints around market fundamentals hence pose 
challenges to the empirical testing of these hypotheses. A more operational 
approach to testing these hypotheses might be based on the difference between two 
commodity price series, as, for instance, the futures price and its underlying spot 
price, or price series of futures contracts with different maturity dates. Since these 
pairs of price series are driven by the same commodity-specific fundamentals, the 
difference in level and variability can be attributed to factors that are specific to the 
commodity price series, including the different composition of traders. A crude 
summary of the empirical literature reveals potential for future research in this area. 
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